From [HERE] Summary: The strategic warning report is intended to provide relevant and necessary intelligence to the senior policy-maker for the United States (U.S.) intelligence community (IC). The strategic warning report aims to identify the necessary posture and response to address the matter referenced in the strategic warning. The strategic warning report will convey to the policy-maker the urgency to respond and the potential consequences concerning national security (Gentry and Gordon 2019). Therefore, the intelligence professional must be clear, concise, and deliberate in presenting the strategic warning to a policymaker.

The national security matter addressed in this strategic warning report concerns the potential degradation and limitations of U.S. intelligence collection and analysis platforms due to the deliberate disinformation campaign directed by the foreign adversary (Frank, Dambre, and Clark, 2022). Contained in this strategic warning report are significant factors affecting the policies regarding national security. The pertinent factors include Assumptions, Analysis, Threats, Indicators, Opportunities, and the Strategic Intelligence Posture (SIP). The foreign adversary’s disinformation campaign may take many forms but is most often seen across virtual social media platforms. Social media platforms are a lightly controlled breeding ground for disinformation strategies. The intelligence professional’s strategic warning is thus that disinformation operations targeting U.S. intelligence collection and national interests represent a critical threat to the intelligence community infrastructure and its ability to provide valued strategic intelligence to senior policy-makers in the intelligence community.

Assumptions

There have been several flawed attempts to inhibit the spread of disinformation. The focus has always been on social media platforms. The role of actors other than social platforms is often ignored, particularly the historical part of mass media in spreading state propaganda or suppressing political expression (CITAP, 2022). Most recently, President Biden established the Disinformation Governance Board to study best practices in combating the harmful effects of disinformation. The board was later dissolved in May 2022. Following the false premise that “broken” social media is responsible for the ills it reveals, regulation will suppress speech (Cato, 2022). Social media restrictions will be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment Rights. Social media restriction is not an infringement when the rights being practiced impede national security. Focusing on the perpetrators and penalizing violators will minimize the spread of disinformation to manageable levels (DHS, 2022).

Analysis

Disinformation has a long history of plaguing Americans. According to Marwick and Kuo (2021), it became apparent in the 2016 U.S. General elections that the spread of disinformation is driven by fundamental human tendencies to share shocking information and to prefer information that conforms with their existing beliefs (Haigh, Haigh, and Matychak, 2019). Disinformation happens in moments of crisis when people search for information to help them understand what is happening or how to stay safe (ShareVerified, 2022). There is evidence that certain groups purposely target U.S. intelligence agencies to discredit their reports. They have been named the ‘deep state’ on many platforms. The narrative is constantly repeated. As a result of this disinformation campaign against the U.S. intelligence agencies, the reports are questioned and often not believed.

Disinformation is crippling the credibility of the United States intelligence agencies. The political, economic, and cultural impacts limit the United States’ ability to govern effectively. In the wake of the crisis in Ukraine that erupted in 2013–2014, the Kremlin has been accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns against the Ukrainian government and western countries by using online trolls, a person or group that intentionally incites discord in online conversations, and state-controlled online outlets such as RT (formerly known as Russia Today), Sputnik and Life News (Bjola and Pammet, 2016). Foreign news has led to a wave of counter-disinformation measures in the West to combat what is seen as a threat to democracy, international security, and stability (Golovchenko, Hartmann, and Adler-Nissen, 2018). Action must be taken immediately to quell the spread of disinformation to ensure the United States can continue supporting Ukraine effectively as Russia reconstitutes and continues its advancements in Eastern Ukraine. More people are beginning to support the narrative that Ukraine is corrupt and perhaps Russia is justified in launching an attack. Failure to counter anti-Ukraine messaging can have an irreversible impact on Western democracy when factual evidentiary data from the intelligence community is rendered propaganda from the ‘deep state.’ More than $40 billion in additional aid to Ukraine was approved by the U.S. Congress on May 19, 2022, bringing the total U.S. commitment during the Russian invasion to roughly $54 billion combined with the aid package passed in March (Pallaro and Parlapiano, 2022). The U.S. cannot sustain this level of support to Ukraine without U.S. support, and the disinformation campaign may prolong the war and the level of aid needed by the Ukrainian government. [MORE]