From [HERE] The intrepid Haaretz reporters delivered a gut punch to Bibi Netanyahu and his persistent effort to blame all the Israeli deaths on October 7 on Hamas terrorism. Haaretz says, “no.”

Gaza Division operations and airstrikes in the first hours of October 7 were based on limited information. The first long moments after the Hamas attack was launched were chaotic. Reports were coming in, with their significance not always clear. When their meaning was understood, it was realized that something horrific had taken place.

Communication networks could not keep up with the flow of information, as was the case for soldiers sending these reports. However, the message conveyed at 11:22 A.M. across the Gaza Division network was understood by everyone. “Not a single vehicle can return to Gaza” was the order. . . .

Documents obtained by Haaretz, as well as testimonies of soldiers, mid-level and senior IDF officers, reveal a host of orders and procedures laid down by the Gaza Division, Southern Command and the IDF General Staff up to the afternoon hours of that day, showing how widespread this procedure was, from the first hours following the attack and at various points along the border. . . .

The Erez border crossing was not the only place this happened. Information obtained by Haaretz and confirmed by the army shows that throughout that morning, the Hannibal procedure was employed at two other locations penetrated by terrorists: the Re’im army base, where the divisional headquarters were located, and the Nahal Oz outpost in which female spotters were based. This did not prevent the kidnapping of seven of them or the killing of 15 other spotters, as well as 38 other soldiers. . . .

One case in which it is known that civilians were hit, a case that received wide coverage, took place in the house of Pessi Cohen at Kibbutz Be’eri. 14 hostages were held in the house as the IDF attacked it, with 13 of them killed. In the coming weeks, the IDF is expected to publish the results of its investigation of the incident, which will answer the question of whether Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram, the commander of Division 99 who was in charge of operations in Be’eri on October 7, was employing the Hannibal procedure. Did he order the tank to move ahead even at the cost of civilian casualties, as he stated in an interview he gave later to the New York Times?

The Hamas attack on October 7 was not a chaotic terrorist action. It was a professional military raid and caught the Israelis completely unprepared. As noted by Haaretz, the Israeli response was uncoordinated mayhem. One aspect ignored in the Haaretz report is the hundreds of vehicles destroyed by Israeli attack helicopters. Israeli forces had no way of knowing if those vehicles were occupied by Hamas fighters or a mixture of Hamas personnel and Israeli hostages. If a legitimate investigation is ever conducted, I think the Israeli public will be shocked to learn that more than 50% of the Israeli deaths that day were inflicted by Israeli military forces trying to prevent Israeli hostages from being taken into Gaza.

How do I come up with that number? There are photos of the vehicles destroyed by Israel on October 7. It appears that more than 500 were hit with air-launched rockets and destroyed. If there was only one Israeli in each of those vehicles (odds are there were more), there were at least 500 Israeli casualties from that alone. We know the names of the Israeli dead. How many were in those cars?

Frankly, there is no difference between Hamas kidnapping Israeli civilians and military personnel and Israel grabbing Palestinians off the streets of the West Bank and locking them up in Israeli prisons with no charges. Same thing. Except the West likes to portray Hamas as mindless terrorists and the Israelis as professional soldiers taking proactive measures against potential terrorists. [MORE]